Individuals and Institutions in Social Economics
This chapter will conclude the sampling of topics which are given as examples of social economics as a system of theory. As we look at some of the micro issues of human psychology which social economics must consider, it is worth beginning with the reminder that there is more than one body of knowledge which can be drawn upon to aid in an economic understanding of human behaviour; e.g., the various branches of psychology, as well as existing syntheses especially intended for use in the field of economics (cf. the work of George Katona, or Amitai Etzioni). As social economics develops there might come to be a standard (though, it is to be hoped, always evolving) set of understandings in this area -but nothing that could be so simply summarised as the statement that economic man maximises his perceived self-interest'.
VII Issues of In looking at micro-level behavior we need to human remind ourselves that, in fact, neither neoclassical psychology economics, nor any other imaginable system of theory that would obviously belong in the field of economics, is much concerned with tracing the behaviour of any one particular individual. The neoclassical system is concerned with economic outcomes which are the result of aggregated individual behaviours, especially in the intersections of the purchasing behaviours and the producing/selling behaviours which create prices. In order for the neoclassical system of theory to be (i.e., to make good predictions and accurate descriptions of this level of activity), it is not necessary for the psychosocial axioms of the system to be realistic, but only for the outcomes to be the same as they would be these axioms were realistic.
Often this parsimonious approach yields as we try to understand changes in these organisms over time; -as our concern focuses on values other than prices which are used in defining some notions of welfare; -as we try to relate some real future with the real present (both of these being disequilibrium realities); -or as we try to make certain necessary translations between reality and theory and back again.
Unfortunately, the neoclassical paradigm contains no way of predicting when its insights will be seriously off, or why; and those occasions are sometimes of great economic significance. This is why there is need for a companion/alternative to the neoclassical paradigm which will look inside the black box of human behaviour.
The psychosocial issues where it seems that the neoclassical model runs into trouble include:
some areas where motivations other than 'maximisation of selfinterest' (e.g., altruism, honesty and trust) have problem (e.g., are we after the utility we will feel by doing our duty; by that associated with self-improvement; or is it simply hedonistic pleasure?) Having made this choice, we then choose the activity that will maximise the preferred type of utility.
As a description of reality, this is probably inferior to a psychology of choice which is not constrained to employ the vocabulary and concepts ('utility' and 'maximisation') of neoclassical economics. However -again, as a description of reality -it is a distinct improvement upon the restriction of utility to selfish gain which is the most useful definition for the neoclassical core.
on from Neva Goodwin Selfish gain is not, of course, the only meaning of utility in the neoclassical paradigm. However, it has been well argued ( ' should want to want', or the possibility that people might benefit from changing wants through a learning process.
We may refer here to Alfred Marshall's unabashedly normative concept of 'progress'. He assumed that the moral structure which is part of the foundation for individual motivations is, or should be, one of society's most important ends; the ultimate public good lies in a kind of progress wherein human wants are trained so that individuals will increasingly want what is good for them. 5 What is good for people, Marshall felt, is to want the kind of reward which a good person wants; i.e., fame, honour, and the pleasure, for its own sake, of serving others. If the moral structure of the society and of its individual participants can gradually be brought toward this orientation the whole society will be better off, for honour will increasingly replace pay as the most sought-after reward, permitting an evener distribution of income without loss of productivity; and consumer satisfaction will increase as individuals at every level care more about the quality of the work they perform.
Tibor Scitovsky gets at Marshall's closely related concept of 'activities' by dividing the sources of achievable 'satisfactions' into two sets, comforts and stimuli, where the latter often include activities such as work, sports and cultural pastimes. Scitovsky stresses that an important source of human satisfaction is the mental stimulation that is associated with novelty. This fact, however, creates 'a logical difficulty which seems to rule out consumer rationality in the sense in which we know and accept it as the governing principle of consumer behaviour in other areas of consumer choice.'6 The logical difficulty comes from the fact that there are stimuli which include novelty (Or surprise) among their satisfying elements and which, at the same time, require an 'investment' of time and effort in learning. Why make the investment if you do not know what the reward will be? But if you do know the reward in advance, you are n,bbed of the element of surprise. An example given by Scitovsky is 'the impossible situation of having to have musical knowledge to be able rationally to decide whether that musical knowledge is worth acquiring. Nor', as he then adds, 'is that problem confined to music; it is common to all forms of stimulus consumption that require a skill for their enjoyment.' (ibid., p. 124). His conclusion is that this paradox is resolved when the previous generation, having experienced the rewards to be had from 'education in consumption skills', provides such 'humanistic education' for the young.
The characteristic which most separates 'comfort' type experiences from 'stimulating' experiences is on the spectrum from familiarity to strangeness, or novelty. A little of the latter is exciting; too much is nerve-wracking. 7 In spite of the varying range of tolerance that different people have for the boredom of familiarity or the alarms of strangeness, one can, nevertheless, make some useful generalisations about the relevance of this point with respect to economic groupings. For example, most people tend strongly to prefer working among people they know to working among strangers. Employers tend to prefer to hire an individual who has some connection, however tenuous, with someone they know, rather than a person who is completely unknown -even though the information gained from the introduction' may have no bearing on qualifications for the job in question.
The economics of consumption, as developed in practice by those who produce in order to sell to consumers (and who 'sell' to consumers what it is that they produce) may depend most obviously upon being able to tickle the desire for novelty; but the economics of production, insofar as it relates to relationships among people who are working, brings out the neglected importance of the desire for familiarity. A social economics with a practical and sustained emphasis upon the values of Man as worker -not just after-hours, but the worker on the job -will have an additional advantage in possessing a special line to the findings of adjacent fields (sociology, psychology, etc.), and a special way of using these insights to organise economic concepts and data. It will also have a point of view sufficiently distinct from the point of view of neoclassical economics as to help clarify the existence and the nature of the latter's point of view.
In this connection, the logical structure of the earlier exercise in goaldefinition may be made somewhat clearer. The primary goal, welfare, analysed in terms of four aspects (survival, happiness, self-actualisation and moral or spiritual development), is to be understood as referring to states of being. As such, this is at some remove from the subjects with which economics can be expected to grapple directly; yet it is critical to keep the 'being' goals in mind to assist in prioritising and balancing the secondary goals. Over the years a number of first-rate sociologists have been individuals who started their educational careers in economics (Talcott Parsons is just one example), then discovered that economics was not dealing with the questions that had driven them to the field, and so moved over to sociology. We need to reverse this drift -to attract into social economics individuals with a strong background in sociology, who can bring with them an ability to see societies as networks of relationships -among individuals, creating institutions; and among institutions as well.
Obviously, not all relationships can be studied at once, and the defining feature of the field of economics is its focus upon things that
Reprinted with permission fi have an economic meaning. The point to be made here is that institutions, governments and networks of relationships must be understood within a more comprehensive context than that traditionally accorded them in the neoclassical system if we are accurately to perceive which of their aspects do, indeed, have the most significant economic meaning. The challenge for social economics is to view whole economic systems -on local, national and transnational levels -as wholes; and to see the integral part played by all institutions, including governments, within the systems at each of these levels.
The role of governments is one of the most important of economic topics, and one of the least well addressed. The subject is equally an embarrassment to Marxian economics, where the expectation was stated by Marx that, if everything else was done right, governments would simply wither away; and to neoclassical economics, where, too, the decision to call on government implies a kind of failure ('market failure', in this case).
Among the institutional issues which will require special attention from social economists, two of the most important are power and competition. Economic and non-economic power which can be used to reduce economic competition is one among many anti-competitive forces to be found in human nature and in the nature of institutions.
If, as suggested earlier (in Chapter 1), idealisations of competition and cooperation occur in the neoclassical and the Marxian paradigms as simplifying assumptions which are, however, inadequate to handle some real world complexities -so, too, is another alternative, coercion, inadequately recognised by both systems. In the neoclassical system coercion, as a power relation, is only considered in relation to the activities of government. Relations in society are assumed to be divided up in such a way that free choices about production and allocation always and only occur in the economic (market) realm; while coerced choices, determined by power relations, are seen as exclusively political (governmental). In fact, government is an important actor in the production and allocation of public goods and services; and coercive, power relations are to be found at many points in the economic sphere. Power relations affect, e.g., the purchase and sale of labour power, as well as transactions between large and small firms, etc.
For different reasons, coercion in relation to economic matters is also insufficiently analysed in the Marxian system. The diversity of kinds and sources of power in the economic sphere is hard to see in a system which relegates all power to a class source. Moreover, communist economics are ultimately concerned with the ideal world on from Neva Goodwin when political and economic coercion will have ceased to exist. In the meantime, the coercion of the 
IX Economic
A distinction needs to be made between a system of systems economic theory, as a set of abstractions about the perceived world, and an economic system, as the actual structure of some grouping of real world economic activities.
The system of neoclassical economic theory has co-evolved along with capitalist economic systems; it is best adapted to explaining capitalist economies, and to assisting in achievement of the capitalist goal of maximising a society's total consumption opportunities through efficiency in production.
The system of Marxian economic theory evolved on a path that took about seventy years before converging with a real communist economic system, but it is nevertheless designed to aid in understanding communist economies, and to promote their objectives of fair distribution of work and consumption.
With what system' shall we associate system of social economic theory'? That question can be answered in two ways.
First, we may note that the capitalist system described by neoclassical theory does not, in fact, exist; any more than the communist society described by Marxian theory is to be found anywhere in the real world. Both systems of theory describe ideal economic systems: one of perfect competition, the other of perfect fairness and cooperation. Social on from Neva Goodwin issues that had not previously seemed important enough to be included in our accounting are now emerging as critical elements of our economies; and goals, too, may be changing. In many ways humanity is at present more affluent than ever before; that very affluence arouses demands for the subordination of the goal of productive efficiency to the goals of economic and social justice. At the same time the costs, to a rapidly approaching future, of production and consumption are being discovered to be much higher than previously imagined. Something like social economics is needed, not only as an alternative to the neoclassical economic explanation of capitalism, but to promote clear thinking, in an increasingly globalised world, about alternatives to both capitalism and communism -neither of which, in any case, really exists as described by neoclassical or Marxian economics.
IXA Macro
Some elements of macro theory are so loosely or and global uncomfortably connected to the core of neoclassieconomics cal theory that they may be regarded as lying outside of the neoclassical pool of light; fair game, in fact, for any other system that can do a better job of incorporating them.
As suggested earlier, the macro elements which do fit into the neoclassical core are, generally, those areas: -where the aggregation of micro elements can be simply made, because the theory of the atomistic cases is applicable to the aggregation thereof; and -where social welfare may be achieved by maximisation of individual welfare.
Trade is an example of where neoclassical economics usefully, but in disregard of some aspects of its own theoretical consistency, employs aggregate concepts as though they resulted from a simple addition of atomistic units. Neoclassical economists often present their argument as though they were 'building up' from a one person, one good economy. This procedure is, in fact, a logical impossibility in light of the phase-shift that occurs when people and goods are aggregated so as to permit trade; one of the most important outcomes of the neoclassical system is, indeed, the welfare-raising effect of trade, which could not be predicted from knowledge of all the actors individually, disregarding interactions among them.
With this said, and accepting some theoretical inconsistency, the neoclassical system nevertheless possesses powerful tools for explaining certain aspects of international trade. Other aspects remain relatively less understood.
As an example both of some neoclassical strengths and of some of its weaknesses, we might consider the global grain trade. We can find here many of the ideal conditions listed in the overall description of the neoclassical core areas: there are relatively complete markets which tend to be capitalistic; many of the conditions for perfect competition (e.g., homogeneous products, many final buyers and sellers) are present; and there are such an enormous number of actors (including a majority of the people in the world, one way or another) that at least some local 'irrationalities' get lost in the averaging out of behaviour. Neoclassical analysis has, therefore, a basis on which to build demandsupply diagrams that are quite realistic. However, this approach loses its grip, for example: -where attention has to be paid to how the aggregate groups of actors are defined (a nation? a farmers' lobby in the EEC? a multinational trading company? a trading bloc?); with its macro aspirations to address social welfare. One problem, which social economics must be designed specifically to avoid, has been the over-balancing of the neoclassical system of theory towards a micro grounding. In spite of the rejection of Utilitarian summing just cited, neoclassical theory has continued, in most respects, to proceed as if human aggregations were in no way different from the sum of the parts. Given this bias, it is probably the case that the neoclassical! Utilitarian approach has the greatest likelihood of contributing to social welfare when it is applied to highly homogeneous societies.
When neoclassical economics is applied to a society with important heterogeneities, it can still appear to work if there is a homogeneous group which is sufficiently dominant so that what applies to that group appears to apply to the whole society. Dissenting voices have been raised in Western societies by various groups, including women, who have argued that there has existed an unrecognised division between the most generalised interests of men in these societies, and those of women; and representative of the poor, who have said that their interests, too, differed from those of the dominant group. From such points of view, the most damning criticism which can be made of the neoclassical system of economic theory is that it has often operated like the theory of the status quo; the theory of the group in power; 'privileged' or 'macho' economics.
Macro economics, as it now exists in the neoclassical system, is a theory addressed to the interests of nation states. It is generally accepted that the goal of macroeconomics (its 'definition of success', as this term will be described in Chapter 9, All of these examples illustrate the forces which go under, or over, or around, or through, the force-field of the nation states." In addition to their social and political ramifications, they have important economic impacts. Recognition and understanding of these impacts requires a 'global economics' that does not at present exist: neither market analysis nor distinctions of class are sufficient to define the relevant actors on the modern world scene.
Returning to the area that has traditionally been defined as 'macro' economics -the area of the nation and its concerns -there remain important areas for exploration which also require some different approaches. Neoclassical economics has not come to terms with the fact that, even in 'capitalist' countries, the private sector is only one of four: the other three being the government, the not-for-profit, and the non-monetised sectors. Models based upon the assumption of profitseeking fit poorly when applied to these last three sectors. They go a long way to explaining the allocation of resources within the first sector, but not within the second, third and fourth; and they leave much to be explained regarding the allocation of resources among the sectors (one of the most critical issues for a modern economy As the end of the twentieth century arrives, communist countries are making decisions which amount to an admission of failure in their economic systems; the degree to which they have achieved their goals of equity in allocation of work and consumption seems insufficient compensation for the loss of efficiency in production. This may make it easier for capitalist countries, and the economists therein, to examine the weaknesses, even while they continue to build upon the strengths, of the socio/poiitical/economic compromises which constitute modern capitalist systems. Some of the requirements for a new, co-evolving economic system and system-of-economic-theory relate to the Human societies are becoming increasingly global societies in which we find that are all poisoning our neighbour's well, and we are all drinking our neighbour's water'. If the reality were as simple as that metaphor, simple pricing mechanisms would solve our problems. In the astonishingly complex world of ever greater globalisation, a value system (undergirded by appropriately redesigned macro and global accounting systems) which assumes a primary importance for the future of the whole human race is the most efficient way to internalise the intertwined, boundaryignoring chains of causes and effects.
In a world where resource constraints will take on a newly compelling force and urgency, we need to think differently about the relationship between consumption and welfare, and between work and welfare. Production needs to be designed, on the one hand, to allow reduced throughput of the factors (see section VIB in Chapter 3, above). On the other hand, if some types of production are thereby limited, the goal must be for other iii' (information intensive) work and leisure, things and activities, to make up for that kss.
We need a system of economic theory that can deal directly with economic issues that are not all market issues. Problems do not necessarily leave the sphere of economics when they do not have good market solutions. Economists must be able to address the issue of balance between markets and other forces: governments, bureaucracies, and the third and fourth sectors -the not-for-profit and the non-monetised (or domestic) spheres of action.
We need, finally, a system of economic theory which can deal overtly with the multiplicity of irrepressible but not always compatible welfare goals that have been left to the unconscious or unadmitted corners of existing theories. We have to have ways of formally recognising the desirability of dispersion of power and enhanced equality of access to the means and the results of production, for example via democratic institutions and general education, as well as via effective markets. Reprinted with permission fi
